It is well known that the notion of transcendental logic has a prominent role in both Kant’s and Husserl’s theories of knowledge. The main aim of the present paper is to study the links between formal and transcendental logic in Husserl on the one hand, and the links between general logic and transcendental logic in Kant on the other. There is a debate about the proper relation between transcendental logic and general logic in Kant’s philosophy. By means of our definition (...) of transcendental logic, mainly drawn from Husserl’s analyses, we will try to offer an appropriate interpretation of Kant’s view. (shrink)

The aim of present paper is to introduce the concept of ‘expressive perception’ in Ernst Cassirer’s philosophical mythology. Having Cited Dorothy Emmet’s methodological objection, the author, by recalling Kantian aspect of Cassirer’s thought and referring to the concept of ‘expressive perception’, would make an attempt to reply on his part: according to Cassirer, this level of perceptive experience is the origin of the mythical form of thinking as a whole and, at the same time, is the original and irreducible altogether. (...) Thus, taking ‘mythical thought’ as an independent form of thinking, beside the ‘critical-empirical’ form of thinking, is, for one thing, completely cogent; for another, due to its dependency upon expressive form of perception, mythical thought would never be quite omitted, rather, keep living latently beneath the skin of mental life. In addition, author explains how much Cassirer owes, regarding to the concept of ‘expressive form of perception’, to Max Scheler. Avoiding to elaborate on Scheler’s detailed argument, Cassirer relies strongly on the consequences Scheler draws from his considerations in his work ‘Wesen und Formen der Sympathie’. Restating Scheler’s argument briefly should help in understanding Cassirer’s idea. (shrink)

Objectivity is one of the most basic and difficult issues in modern and contemporary philosophy. The present paper is devoted to this issue from view- point of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Since perception, particularly sense perception, in view of intentionality, as lowest level of objectivity can act as the base for perceiving the objectivity of other objects, whether real or unreal, it has been discussed in this paper. To do this, objectivity of the sense perception and its role in leading the (...) mind toward essential and ideal objects, and conversely, the role of latter objects in objectivity of the perception itself will be explored. Because the concepts of objectivity and evidence are correlate in Husserl’s philosophy, and since evidence as the self-given manifests itself, from the very beginning, in the lowest level, namely the objects of sense perception, and considering that evidence and objectivity of sense perception concern this lowest level, the critical viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology provides a firm and new basis for objectivity if taken at its full competence. (shrink)